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Intuition, Self-Evidence, and
Understanding
Philip Stratton-Lake
Robert Audi’s work on intuitionist epistemology is extremely important for
the new intuitionism, as well as rationalist thought more generally.1 He has
done more than anyone to defend and develop the traditional intuitionist
thesis that basic moral propositions are self-evident. Part of that defense is
his account of self-evidence which, like previous accounts, grounds our
knowledge of basic moral truths in our understanding of them, but makes
progress over earlier accounts by arguing that an adequate understanding
justiﬁes, rather than compels, belief in self-evident propositions. Despite his
important contributions to an intuitionist epistemology, I think his account
of self-evidence is mistaken. I will put forward an alternative account of self-
evidence in what follows, and argue (in a rather Socratic style) that once we
have a good understanding of this notion we can see that it plays no
distinctive epistemological role. Since the idea that certain moral proposi-
tions are self-evident is so controversial, I suggest that intuitionists do best to
avoid this notion. Before I begin, however, it will help to sort out some
terminological matters.
First, intuitions are a certain sort of mental state. The nature of this state
is disputed. Some claim it is a certain sort of belief,2 a disposition to believe,3
a felt attraction to assent,4 or an intellectual seeming.5 At this stage this
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented to audiences at the University of
Reading, the University of Warwick, The New Intuitionism, Gdansk, June 2014, and the
Wisconsin Metaethics Workshop, September 2014. I have learned a lot from these
discussions and believe the chapter is much better as a result. I have also beneﬁted greatly
from the very helpful comments from OUP’s anonymous referees. I am grateful to
everyone who has helped me to try to get clear on the issues I address here.
2 Audi (1997: 40). 3 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux (2009).
4 Sosa (2007: 60). 5 Bealer (1996), Chudnoff (2013), Huemer (2005).
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doesn’t matter. The point is simply to distinguish intuitions from their
content, and this will apply to any account of intuitions.
The sort of intuitions I am interested in are intuitions which have
propositions as their content, rather than, say, properties or concepts.
These propositions are intuitive propositions. What will count as an intui-
tive proposition will vary according to one’s account of intuitions. It may be
a pre-theoretical proposition that is such that it can be justiﬁably believed
non-inferentially, or simply a proposition that is disposed to present itself as true
to someone who has an adequate understanding of it. For the moment, however,
I will rely on an intuitive grasp of the notion of an intuitive proposition.
I can, however, distinguish intuitive propositions from other things that
they may be confused with. Intuitive propositions are not the same as
obvious propositions, since not all obvious propositions are disposed to
present themselves as true to someone who understands them. That there
are mountains in Switzerland, and that an object will fall to the ground if
I drop it, are obvious, but are not intuitive in the sense in which I am
interested. Also, not all intuitive propositions are obviously true to everyone
who understands them. Indeed, many people may deny the truth of
intuitive propositions. For instance, moral error theorists deny the truth of
many intuitive moral propositions.6 So error theorists would deny that any
moral proposition is obviously true, since they think that all such proposi-
tions are false. For similar reasons, intuitive propositions are not the same as
common sense propositions.
Since intuitions may not be beliefs, it is useful to distinguish intuitions
from intuitive beliefs or judgements.7 An intuitive belief is simply one that
has an intuitive proposition as its content. It may be thought that the
distinction between intuitions and intuitive beliefs collapses if intuitions
turn out to be a certain sort of belief—for example, beliefs that are pre-
theoretical, ﬁrmly held, and non-inferentially believed. But even if intu-
itions are a certain sort of belief, it does not follow that all intuitive beliefs
will be intuitions. For a start, an intuitive proposition may be believed on the
basis of some argument. Since the proposition is believed by means of
inference (from an argument), the belief will not count as an intuition. Also,
if one has a certain degree of conviction as a necessary condition of an intuition
then not all intuitive beliefs will be intuitions, as some of these beliefs may lack
the required level of conviction. So no matter what one’s account of intuition
is, it is worth distinguishing intuitions from intuitive beliefs.
6 Error theorists need not deny all moral intuitions. For instance, an error theorist
could accept his intuition about the transitivity of better-than.
7 In this chapter, I make no distinction between beliefs and judgments, so everything
I say about beliefs should be taken to apply to judgments also. But nothing hangs on this.
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Audi follows all classical intuitionists in claiming that some moral pro-
positions are self-evident.8 Audi’s account of self-evidence makes signiﬁcant
progress over earlier accounts, as he can allow that someone can have an
adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition yet not believe it. I will
lay out Audi’s account of self-evidence in due course. For now, all I want to
note is that self-evidence is a property of a proposition rather than of a
mental state. So strictly speaking, only propositions are self-evident. We can
talk of self-evident beliefs, so long as we remember that these are just beliefs
in self-evident propositions, and that strictly speaking it is not the belief that
is self-evident but the proposition believed.
2 .1 SELF-EVIDENCE
Classic ethical intuitionists tended to understand self-evident moral truths as
ones that compel assent if properly understood. This understanding has the
problem that many moral philosophers who seem to have an adequate
understanding of what the intuitionists call self-evident propositions do
not assent to them. Audi’s account of self-evidence gets around this problem
by claiming that self-evident propositions, but do not compel belief if
adequately understood. He claims that self-evident propositions are
truths such that (a) adequately understanding them is sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for
believing them . . . , and (b) believing them on the basis of adequately understanding
them entails knowing them.9
I’ll focus on the ﬁrst conjunct in what follows, but everything I say about
this will apply to the second. Although I have followed Audi’s account for
some time, I have come to think that the idea that our understanding of a
proposition can justify us in believing it is rather odd. Our understanding
just seems a very peculiar thing on which to base a belief. If I asked you why
you believe a self-evident proposition, I would be very surprised indeed if
you replied, “because I understand it,” or “my reason for believing it is my
understanding of it.” In answering my question, you are explaining why you
believe this proposition, but the relevant sort of explanation would track
what you take to justify your belief. So the oddity of this answer illustrates
the oddity of the view that an understanding of a proposition can justify
belief in it.
I think the oddity of the idea that our understanding of a proposition can
justify us in believing it, has two sources. The ﬁrst is that epistemic
8 Audi (1997; 2004). 9 Audi (2008: 478). See also Audi (2011: 178).
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justiﬁcations need to be appropriately linked to truth, and in the case of
synthetic propositions, the appropriate link to truth of a justiﬁer and the
belief it justiﬁes is that the former must constitute evidence for the truth of
the latter.10 Call this the evidential criterion of epistemic justiﬁcation. The
second source is that our understanding of a proposition does not provide
evidence for its truth (apart from a few self-referential examples, such as that
“I understand this proposition”). These two claims imply that our under-
standing of a synthetic proposition cannot justify us in believing it.
This argument does not mean that I will have to deny that understanding
justiﬁes belief in analytical propositions.11 My claim is that there has to be a
constraint on what sort of thing can justify belief, and that that constraint is
an appropriate link to the truth of the belief justiﬁed. In respect to synthetic
propositions the link to truth is evidence, understood as something that
raises the (epistemic) probability of the truth of the proposition for which it
is evidence. This applies not only to synthetic a posteriori propositions, but
to synthetic a priori propositions also, which is the sort of proposition in
which ethical intuitionists are interested. One might think that evidence is
out of place with regard to analytic propositions, but evidence isn’t the only
appropriate connection with truth. Since analytic propositions are true in
virtue of their meaning, their meaning is their truth-maker. The meaning of
some analytic proposition is grasped by our understanding of it, so in such
cases our understanding is suitably linked to the truth-maker of the prop-
osition understood, and so is appropriately linked to the truth of such
propositions. Because our understanding of analytic propositions is suitably
linked to the truth of those propositions, our understanding may well be
able to justify us in believing analytic propositions.12 This is not true of
synthetic propositions, because these propositions are not true simply in
virtue of their meaning, even if they are a priori. So my claim that our
understanding of synthetic truths cannot justify us in believing them
remains unaffected by the acknowledgement that understanding might be
able to justify us in believing analytic truths.
10 One might think that pragmatic considerations such as the fact that believing p will
make my life go better is a reason to believe that p. I agree with Parﬁt and others who
maintain that such pragmatic considerations are really reasons to desire that I believe p,
and to take steps to make it the case that I believe p, rather than reasons to believe p. In
other words, these are not reasons to believe at all, but are reasons to desire and to act in
certain ways.
11 My thanks to Daniel Wodak, who suggested the following argument to me, and
helped me get clear on what I am and am not committed to.
12 One might think that even with regard to analytic propositions, the idea that it is
our understanding of them that justiﬁes us in believing them still sounds odd. But since
my concern in this chapter is with the justiﬁcation of synthetic a priori propositions, I will
not defend what I say about analytic propositions here by responding to objections to it.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 22/4/2016, SPi
Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding 31
Comp. by: Muthuraj Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002724742 Date:22/4/16
Time:16:35:54 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002724742.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 32
It may be claimed that synthetic a priori truths are conceptual,13 but the
term “conceptual” is used to mean different things. Sometimes philosophers
treat “conceptual truth” as synonymous with “analytic truth.” So under-
stood, it is false that synthetic a priori truths are conceptual truths. Some-
times a conceptual truth is understood as one that anyone with a clear grasp
of the relevant concepts would endorse. I don’t think the synthetic a priori
truths which intuitionists are interested in can be understood as conceptual
truths in this sense either. I do not think Sidgwick or Moore showed a lack
of understanding when they denied the truth of certain deontological
principles. The same is true of those who raise doubts about the transitivity
of “better than.” Even those who claim that understanding does justify belief
in self-evident moral propositions only claim that an adequate understand-
ing of them justiﬁes belief—this understanding does not compel belief,
which I think it would have to if these were conceptual truths.
But if understanding cannot justify us in believing synthetic self-evident
moral propositions, what can? There are limited options. One possibility
would be the content of what is believed—the self-evident proposition
itself—but I don’t think that can be right. P does not, I believe, justify
belief in P.
Another possibility is that our intuition of the self-evident proposition
justiﬁes us in believing it. Whether this idea will work out will depend on
how we understand intuitions. Intuitions cannot justify belief in self-evident
propositions if they are understood as Audi understands them. But I think
there is good reason to reject Audi’s understanding of intuitions, and to
accept an alternative account that does permit this justiﬁcatory role.
2 .2 AUDI ’S ACCOUNT OF INTUITION
Robert Audi understands intuitions primarily as beliefs of a certain sort—
that is, beliefs that are non-inferred, ﬁrmly held, pre-theoretical, and based
solely on an understanding of their content.14 A belief is non-inferred if it is
not (at the time) based on a premise or argument.15 This allows that there
can be an argument for the intuitive proposition, and that one can believe it
on that basis. It’s just that if one did believe it on the basis of the argument,
one’s belief would not constitute an intuition, even though it had an
intuitive proposition as its content.
13 Audi sometimes seems to suggest that—for example, Audi (2015: 68).
14 Audi (1997: 40–1). 15 Audi (1997: 40).
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The second necessary feature of an intuition, according to Audi, is that it
is “a moderately ﬁrm cognition.”16 At a bare minimum this means that one
must have come down on the matter. Indeed, Audi seems to endorse Ross’s
view that intuitions are “convictions”17—that is, beliefs with a relatively
high level of ﬁrmness. Their ﬁrmness means that they would be relinquished
“only through such weighty considerations as a felt conﬂict with a ﬁrmly
held theory or with another intuition.”18
The third condition is that “intuitions must be formed in the light of an
adequate understanding of their propositional objects.”19 This is the positive
correlate of the negative claim in the ﬁrst condition. The ﬁrst condition tells
us what intuitions must not be based on. The third condition tells us what
they must be based on. This condition involves getting the relevant prop-
osition clearly in view, and this might require reﬂection, consideration of
particular cases, and an ability to make certain inferences. It may also
require, as Ross claimed, a certain degree of mental maturity.20 When
Audi says that intuitions must be formed in the light of an adequate
understanding of their propositional objects, I understand the phrase
“formed in the light of” normatively as meaning “justiﬁed by” rather than
non-normatively as “explained by.”
The fourth requirement is that intuitions must be pre-theoretical. By this
Audi means that “they are neither evidentially dependent on theories nor
themselves theoretical hypotheses.”21 I’m not sure that this condition is
needed, as it does not seem to add anything to the ﬁrst condition. If some
belief I have is based on some theory then it will be inferred. Similarly,
theoretical hypotheses, if they are not intuitive, will have some sort of
argument for them, and will presumably be believed on that basis, ﬂouting
both the ﬁrst and third conditions. Given that the very idea of a pre-
theoretical belief is controversial, I think Audi is better off discarding this
condition and sticking with his ﬁrst three. Henceforth I shall refer to his
three conditions, rather than his ofﬁcial four.
As was noted earlier, Audi’s doxastic account of intuitions does not negate
the difference between intuitions and intuitive beliefs, since a belief in an
intuitive proposition may not satisfy his three conditions. But in cases where
the intuitive belief satisﬁes all of Audi’s conditions, there is no difference
between it and an intuition with the same content.
If Audi is right that intuitions are a certain type of belief, then our
intuition of a self-evident proposition cannot justify us in believing that
proposition. This is because an intuition is, on this account, a certain type of
16 Audi (1997: 40). 17 Audi (1997: 40). 18 Audi (1997: 40).
19 Audi (1997: 41). 20 Ross (2002: 12, 29). 21 Audi (1997: 41).
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belief, and my belief that p cannot justify my belief that p. There are a few
exceptions to this claim. My belief that I am believing can justify itself, as
can the belief that I exist, that I have mental states, and so on. But these
exceptions do not help the ethical intuitionist who wants the intuition that,
say, pleasant experiences are better than agony to justify us in believing that
pleasure is better than agony. My belief in such propositions can never
justify me in believing them.
Audi’s account is vulnerable to another objection that is independent of
our concern with self-evidence—namely, that it cannot make sense of the
recalcitrance of intuitions. By recalcitrance I mean that many intuitions
continue even when the agent does not believe them. For instance, I have
the mathematical intuition that there are more natural numbers than even
numbers. When I consider the two series I have the very strong intuition
that there are twice as many numbers in one as in the other. I know this
intuition is false, so I do not believe that there are more natural numbers
than even numbers. Nonetheless I still have this intuition. The same is true
of my intuition that 0.9 recurring does not equal 1. I have this intuition yet
do not believe it, as I have seen and accepted the proof that 0.9 recurring
does equal 1.
There are plenty of moral cases that illustrate the recalcitrance of intu-
itions. I have the intuition that if it is permissible for A to Φ, then it is at
least pro tanto wrong for others to try to stop A from Φing. But I do not
believe this is true. It is permissible for strikers in a game of football to score
goals: in fact it is their job. Nonetheless, defenders do nothing wrong at all if
they try to stop strikers from scoring goals. That’s their job. I suspect many
act consequentialists continue to have deontological intuitions even though
they do not believe them. I am sure they feel the force of the apparent
counter examples to their moral theory, but do not believe their intuitions,
because they are convinced by their overall normative theory. In The Right
and the Good, Ross had the intuition that he has no obligation to enjoy
innocent pleasure for himself when he can, but he did not believe this.22
Someone might have the strong intuition about the transitivity of “better
than” but not believe this (because she is persuaded by Temkin’s argu-
ments).23 Finally, I am certain error theorists continue to have all sorts of
moral intuitions, even if they don’t believe any of them. This would be the
moral analogue of someone for whom the world is presented as colored but
who, for theoretical reasons, does not believe there are any colors.
Audi’s view cannot capture this recalcitrance. Although on his account it
is possible to believe that p without having an intuition that p, it is not
22 Ross (2002: 25–6). 23 Temkin (2012).
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possible to have an intuition that p without a belief that p. So he cannot
capture the common phenomenon that we have intuitions that we do not
believe. The best he could do is maintain that in such situations the
individual has contradictory beliefs—she believes that p and she believes
that not-p. But that is a complete distortion of what is going on. Someone
who has an intuition that p but does not believe it (because she thinks that p
is false) does not have the most coherent set of mental states. But it is too
much to say that she is so irrational as to have explicitly contradictory beliefs.
Furthermore, it is one thing to capture the fact that some people have
intuitions which they think are false, and another to capture the fact that
people have intuitions they do not believe. His doxastic account cannot
capture the latter in any way.24
Since neither Audi’s nor any doxastic account of intuitions can capture
the epistemic role of intuitions and their recalcitrance, I think we should
reject this account. What account of intuitions should intuitionists endorse?
There are a number of options, and this is not the place to go into the detail
of the debate about the nature of intuitions. I will, however, make a few
quick points to motivate my own preferred view.
One option is to think of intuition as a disposition or inclination to
believe. That would capture recalcitrance, since I may be inclined to believe
some proposition even when I do not believe it. But not everything I am
inclined to believe is an intuition. I am inclined to believe propositions that
ﬁt with various theoretical commitments I already have, but I have no
intuitions about these.
This view might be modiﬁed to deal with this objection. It could state
that intuitions are inclinations to believe that p upon considering just
p. When I am inclined to believe some proposition that ﬁts with other
theoretical commitments I already have, I am not considering just that
proposition, but am also considering my theoretical commitments and its
ﬁt with them. But even in this modiﬁed form it is unclear how intuitions
can justify beliefs based on them, for the mere fact that I am inclined to
believe these things seems to grant no justiﬁcatory force to them even when
I consider them alone. Whether it does will depend on why I am inclined to
believe them. If I am inclined to believe some proposition just because it is,
for example, ﬂattering, then that inclination will provide no justiﬁcation for
believing the ﬂattering proposition. There may be a more legitimate ground
24 In his most recent work (e.g., Audi 2015: 62) Audi does acknowledge recalcitrance
and accepts a type of non-doxastic, episodic intuition that makes sense of it. He also agrees
that the non-doxastic intuition can justify doxastic intuitions—what I have called
intuitive beliefs. I still think it is clearer to reserve the name “intuition” for the more
basic state and “intuitive beliefs” for the derivative notion.
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of this inclination, but then the justiﬁcation will ﬂow from this ground
rather than from the inclination that it grounds. For instance, if I am
inclined to believe that certain things are colored because they present
themselves to me as colored, then it will be these visual presentations that
justify my color beliefs rather than the fact that I am inclined to have these
beliefs as a result of these visual presentations.
A similar point can be made against an account of intuitions as a felt
attraction to believe. Like the dispositional account, this account captures
recalcitrance well. Phenomenologically, it seems accurate to say that we
might feel the attraction of some proposition even when we do not believe
it, and this attraction may well be what this recalcitrant intuition is. But
whether this felt attraction can justify belief in the attractive proposition will
depend on why we are attracted to it and, as in the dispositional account, in
the good cases it will be what grounds this attraction rather than the
attraction itself that justiﬁes belief in the attractive proposition. If it is
attractive because it seems true, then we will pro tanto be justiﬁed in
believing the proposition. If it is attractive because it is ﬂattering, then we
will not be justiﬁed. And in the good case it will be the seeming true, rather
than the felt attraction, that justiﬁes belief in the intuitive proposition.
The best account of intuition is, in my view, that offered by George
Bealer. According to this view, intuitions are not beliefs or judgments, but a
distinct mental state that he calls intellectual seemings. Intellectual seemings
are understood as occurrent mental states, distinct from judgment, guesses,
or hunches, whose phenomenology is relevantly similar to that of perceptual
seemings. Just as the world can present itself to the mind perceptually as
being a certain way, such as being red, or square, so certain propositions can
present themselves to the mind as true. They do not always do this
immediately. Sometimes they require reﬂection. Bealer gives the examples
of De Morgan’s laws. When ﬁrst considering this there may be nothing like
its seeming true. But after reﬂecting on it for a few moments it is like a light
going on. Suddenly this proposition presents itself to the mind as true.25
The same is true of certain intuitive moral propositions, such as the
transitivity of better than. When one ﬁrst hears this, one has to think for a
moment—to get the proposition clearly in view, as it were—but once it is
clearly in view it just strikes one as true.26
Understood as intellectual seemings, intuitions may plausibly be said to
justify beliefs with the same content. Just as something’s seeming blue may
justify me in believing that it is blue, so a proposition’s seeming true may
25 Bealer (1996: 5).
26 By getting a proposition clearly in view I mean pretty much what Audi calls having
an adequate understanding of it (see, e.g., Audi 2015: 66).
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justify me in believing it. The justiﬁcatory role of intuitions is disputed, and
this is not the place to enter that debate. All I am saying here is that, unlike
Audi’s account of intuitions, Bealer’s account at least makes sense of the idea
that intuitions are the sort of thing that can justify beliefs with the same
content. This putative justiﬁcation is both pro tanto and defeasible. If I learn
that I have been given a drug that makes all false moral propositions seem
true and all true ones false, then the fact that some moral proposition seems
true will give me no justiﬁcation at all for believing it. On the contrary, in
such a case its seeming true will justify me in believing that it is false. Even
absent undercutting defeaters, the justiﬁcation for some proposition pro-
vided by one’s intuition of it is only pro tanto—that is, it may be out-
weighed by other considerations, so that all things considered I am not
justiﬁed in believing the intuitive proposition. But it is plausible to believe
that, absent reason to distrust some intuition, or to disbelieve them, we may
believe that things are the way they seem intellectually, just as, absent
undercutting defeaters, we may believe that things are the way they seem
perceptually.
Although intuitions understood as intellectual seemings can be explained,
they cannot be justiﬁed, whether this is non-inferentially or inferentially (by
means of some argument). We can explain why some proposition presents
itself to the mind as true, or seems true, but we cannot justify its seeming
true. The same is true of perceptual seemings. Like intellectual seemings, we
can explain why something seems a certain way, but we cannot justify its
seeming that way. To attempt to justify a seeming would be to commit a
category mistake.
Although intuitions cannot be justiﬁed, intuitive beliefs can be justiﬁed,
either inferentially (by means of argument) or non-inferentially, on the basis
of an intuition with the same content. One might also say that intuitive
propositions can be justiﬁed, although that seems slightly odd to me.
Propositions can be true or false, but it sounds odd to me to say that they
can be justiﬁed. The proposition that 2+2=4 is true, but is this proposition
justiﬁed? We can ask this of our belief that 2+2=4, but it seems rather
peculiar to ask it of a proposition. An intuitive proposition could be the
conclusion of an argument, but the argument would justify belief in the
proposition, it would not justify the proposition. Nothing I go on to say,
however, hangs on this last point.
The phenomenological similarity of intuitions with perceptual seemings
captures the recalcitrance of intuitions well. There is a certain degree of
passivity involved in seemings. We have already covered part of this passivity
in noting that we cannot reason to a seeming. In this way they are not under
our rational control. Another way in which they are not under our rational
control is that they tend to persevere even when we decide that things are
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not as they seem. This is certainly true in relation to perceptual seemings. If
I reasoned to the view that there are no such things as colors, this view would
not stop the world seeming colored. Similarly, my knowledge that two lines
are of the same length in a Muller-Lyer illusion does not stop the lines
seeming unequal. If intuitions are intellectual seemings then we would
expect the same sort of recalcitrance of our intuitions, and as I have already
noted, that is exactly what we ﬁnd. In some cases we can train ourselves so
that things no longer seem to be the way we believe or know they are not.
A consequentialist may try to lose his deontological intuitions by avoiding
deontologists, reading only consequentialist philosophers, and mixing only
with other consequentialists. But the same is true of certain perceptual
seemings. I may, over time, be able to train myself so that the lines in a
Muller-Lyer illusion no longer appear different to me. (One of my graduates
claims she has done this.) The point is one of degree rather than of kind.
The idea is that intuitions are more resistant to our beliefs about their truth
than beliefs are, and this is just what one would expect if intuitions are
seemings.
In his more recent work Audi allows that some intuitions are intellectual
seemings, although he prefers to call these “intuitive seemings” rather than
“intuitions.”27 What I have argued is that he should abandon his doxastic
account of intuitions and endorse Bealer’s view that all intuitions are
intellectual seemings. This would not only better ﬁt the epistemological
and psychological facts, but also enable him to solve a certain problem with
his account of self-evidence, to which I now turn.
2 .3 AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT
OF SELF-EVIDENCE
I have argued that the account of intuitions as intellectual seeming has
certain advantages over the doxastic account which would allow intuitions
to play the role of justiﬁer of a belief with the same content. So endorsing
the seeming account of intuitions gives intuitionists what they need to ﬁll
the place vacated by understanding in their account of self-evidence. With
this account of intuition we can offer the following revised account of self-
evidence:
Self-evident propositions are truths such that (a) a clear intuition of them is sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for believing them, and (b) believing them on the basis of a clear
intuition of them entails knowing them.
27 Audi (2011: 177).
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This account does not rest on the idea that understanding is a justiﬁer, but it
allows that an adequate understanding of a proposition can have an epi-
stemic role. Suppose, for example, there is some proposition p of which I do
not have a very good understanding, and which consequently does not seem
true to me when I consider it. Now suppose that I have some brain implant
which has the effect of making p seem true to me when I consider it, even
though my understanding of p is not improved.28 It seems to me that
epistemically I am in no better a position than I was earlier. That p now
seems true to me does not add any justiﬁcation for believing p as it would if
p seemed true at least in part as the result of a better understanding of p. So
an adequate understanding of an intuitive proposition can have a bearing on
how we stand epistemically towards that proposition even if our under-
standing of that proposition does not justify us in believing it. This thought
experiment suggests that understanding is a necessary condition of a seem-
ing having the sort of justiﬁcatory force it has by ﬁguring in the right sort of
explanation of why that proposition seems true. Some other explanations of
why a proposition seems true, such as the brain implant, will either attenu-
ate or negate completely the default justiﬁcation provided by the seeming.
It may look as though this account of a self-evident proposition makes all
intuitive propositions self-evident. But it does not. First, not all intuitions
will have the relevant degree of clarity. For example, our intuitions about
trolley cases leave all sorts of issues unstated, such as why the people are on
the tracks, why they can’t get out of the way, their age, etc. Second, not all
intuitions would be sufﬁcient to ground knowledge. Intuitions about scen-
arios, such as trolley cases, justify us in believing their content, and this
justiﬁcation may be sufﬁcient for belief, but it is not sufﬁcient for know-
ledge, even if one’s belief is based on that intuition. I would not claim to
know that it is right to pull the lever in a standard trolley case, but (pace error
theorists) I would claim to know that pleasure is better than agony. So
I would say that the latter but not the former is self-evident. The former is
merely intuitive.
It is true that whether some intuition is clear, and whether it provides
justiﬁcation that is sufﬁcient for knowledge, will be disputed and sometimes
vague. I do not, however, see this as a problem, since philosophers, includ-
ing ethical intuitionists, argue about which propositions are self-evident,
and our account should make sense of this disagreement.29
28 I borrow this example from Markie (2013).
29 We may, nonetheless, use certain features as defeasible justiﬁcation for believing
that some intuitive proposition is self-evident. One such criterion is that the proposition
presents itself as necessary—that is, it is what Bealer calls an a priori intuition.
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2.4 ARE INTUITIONS EVIDENCE FOR THEIR
CONTENT?
Someone might claim that intuitions do not satisfy the evidential condition
on epistemic justiﬁcation, and so as far as that goes, are in no better shape
than understanding. Chudnoff argues that the link between justiﬁers and
evidence is either trivial, as there is no distinction, or false. Evidence, he
maintains, may be understood ether as whatever justiﬁes, or as consider-
ations that count in favor of or against your having certain beliefs.30 If the
former is correct, then saying that justiﬁers for a belief must be evidence for
the proposition believed is simply trivially true, so doesn’t add a substantive
constraint on what justiﬁes. If the latter is correct, then justiﬁers are not
evidence, for intuitions are experiences, he claims, not considerations. Since
only considerations constitute evidence, and intuitions are not considerations,
then intuitions cannot constitute evidence. But, he maintains, they do justify.31
This does not damage my argument against the view that understanding
cannot justify. Even if evidence and justiﬁers were the same thing, it would
be very implausible to suppose that our understanding of some proposition
constitutes evidence for its truth. If we were very conﬁdent that our
understanding of a proposition justiﬁes us in believing that proposition,
then we might bite the bullet and insist that it just follows from this (on the
account we are considering) that our understanding constitutes evidence for
the truth of the belief understood. But I for one have no ﬁrm conviction that
our understanding justiﬁes in this way. So even if justiﬁers and evidence
were the same thing, I could still maintain that understanding does not
constitute justiﬁcation on the ground that it does not constitute evidence.
Furthermore, it is not clear that intuitions are not considerations that
count for or against having certain beliefs. That will, of course, depend on
how we understand a consideration. On one plausible view, a consideration
is something that should be considered in deliberation, and it is very
plausible to suppose that our intuitions should be considered in our delib-
eration no matter what their nature. So if evidence for a belief is a consid-
eration that counts in favor of that belief, then intuitions could be evidence.
Even if Chudnoff ’s two accounts of evidence did cast doubt on the idea
that intuition justiﬁes, he has hardly exhausted the way in which we may
understand evidence. Wemight understand evidence as something that raises
the epistemic probability of the truth of that proposition for which it is
evidence. That “something” may be a consideration (however considerations
30 Chudnoff (2013: 147). 31 Chudnoff (2013: 147).
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are understood), but it need not be. It might be an experience or mental state,
such as an intellectual seeming. An intellectual seeming looks like it is the sort
of thing that can raise the epistemic probability of the truth of the intuitive
proposition, just as perceptual seemings can. Unless I have reason to doubt
that things are the way they seem, the fact that something seems red to me
increases the epistemic probability that it is red. The same is true, I think, for
intellectual seemings. So on at least this view of evidence, intellectual seem-
ings may be—and I think are—evidence, which is just how much of the
philosophical literature regards them. If that is right then, unlike understand-
ing, they can satisfy the evidential constraint on justiﬁers, and so can justify
belief in their content.
Some intuitionists deny that intuitions constitute evidence for their
content. Huemer is one. Huemer understands intuitions as intellectual
seemings, and claims that intuitionists
should not say that intuitions function as a kind of evidence from which we do or
should infer moral conclusions. He should say that for some moral truths, we need
no evidence, since we are directly aware of them, and that awareness takes the form of
intuitions.32
Well it may be that we need no evidence beyond that provided by the
intuition of the proposition in question, but that hardly rules out the idea
that our intuition is evidence for a belief with the same content. If it were,
the belief would be based on that intuition, but it would not be inferred in
the relevant sense.
Tropman makes Huemer’s point in a slightly different way. She writes:
I do not infer, says Huemer, that killing is wrong on the basis of noticing that it
seems wrong. This inferential picture is mistaken because it inappropriately treats
appearances as the objects of belief and then supposes that we infer moral claims
from premises about how things appear to us. For Huemer, it is the appearances
themselves, and not our beliefs about them, that ground belief.33
If we regard intuitions so understood as evidence, must we believe that they
are evidence and infer our belief that things are as they seem from that belief?
32 Huemer (2005: 121–2).
33 Tropman (2014: 183–4). See also:
For there to be a basing relation between appearances and belief, the believer must
appreciate in some sense the logical support that the appearance provides for the belief.
This appreciation need not be explicitly noted in consciousness, but it must at least be
tacit in the believer’s thinking, as evidenced by a disposition to cite the appearance as his
or her reason for the belief. Unfortunately, this means that the belief would be held on the
basis of premises or reasons, undermining its alleged non-inferential character. (2014:
186)
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I do not see why we should take this extra step. If I regard some intuition as
evidence for its content—that is, as counting in favor of the truth of that
content—then I will believe that it constitutes such evidence. But we need
not accept that my belief in that content is inferred from the belief about the
evidential status of the intuition. If I believe the intuition counts in favor of
its content then I will base my belief in that content on the intuition. That
is, after all, what I believe supports that intuitive belief. So why think the
intuitive belief is supported by another belief, rather than the thing that
I regard as evidence for it?
This point can be made clear in the case of perceptual seemings. If asked
why I believe some object is blue, I would say, “because it looks blue,” or
factively “because I can see that it is blue.” I would not say, “because I believe
it looks blue,” or “because I believe that I can see that it is blue,” unless
I wasn’t sure that it did look blue. This suggests that I regard the perceptual
presentation as counting in favor of the truth of the proposition—that is, as
evidence—not my belief that I am having the perceptual presentation. The
same is true of intellectual seemings.
Intuitionists certainly should not claim that if we base an intuitive belief
on anything, then we are inferring it from that thing. If they did, they would
rule out in advance the possibility of a non-inferential justiﬁcation for an
intuitive belief, or at least basing our belief on that justiﬁcation. So far, then,
we have seen no reason to suppose that intuitions cannot be evidence for
their content.
2 .5 WHAT FOLLOWS FROM THIS ACCOUNT?
One conclusion one might draw from my revised account of self-evidence is
that the choice between what Bedke calls the “self-evidence theory” and the
“intellectual seemings theory”34 sets up a false dichotomy for intuitionists.
For by deﬁning self-evidence in terms of intuitions (understood as seem-
ings), there is no longer opposition between these two approaches.
Although attractive, and conciliatory, this conclusion would, I think, be
the wrong one to draw. The right conclusion would be that intuitionists
should give up talk of self-evident moral propositions. I think that once the
notion of self-evidence is properly understood, we can see that it has no
important epistemic role to play. Once we learn that it is our intuition of
some self-evident proposition rather than our understanding of it that
34 Bedke (2008: 254ff.).
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justiﬁes us in believing it, we can see that all of the epistemic work is done by
moral intuitions. They are the things that do the justifying. We can call a
subclass of intuitive propositions self-evident, but once we get clear on what
that means, all we are saying is that that proposition is such that an intuition
of it justiﬁes us in believing it, and provides a strong enough justiﬁcation to
ground knowledge. But all of that could be said without using the term
“self-evidence.”We do not learn that there is something else that provides a
distinctive sort of justiﬁcation for belief—namely, an appropriately rich
understanding—but merely report that our intuition of that proposition
provides a strong justiﬁcation for believing it. All of the justiﬁcatory work is
done by the same thing that does the work in non-self-evident intuitive
propositions—namely, our intuition of them.
So understood the epistemic role of the self-evident would be relevantly
analogous to the normative role played by goodness according to the buck-
passing account.35 According to this account of goodness, to be good is,
roughly, to have features that give everyone reason to have a pro-attitude
towards that thing.36 So understood it is not goodness itself that has a
distinctive normative role, but the reasons it reports. This is not a form of
eliminativism about goodness. It is not saying that there is no such thing as
goodness: there are only reasons. It is saying, rather, that there is such a thing
as goodness, and it is to be understood in terms of reasons. Similarly, my
account of self-evidence does not say that there is no such thing as self-
evidence: there are just intuitions. It says, rather, that there is such a thing as
self-evidence, and this is to be understood in terms of intuitions. But like the
buck-passing account of goodness, my account of self-evidence makes us
aware that self-evidence does not identify a different sort of reason-giving
feature, but rather reports the presence of reason-giving features that we are
already familiar with—in this case, intuitions.
Abandoning self-evidence as a signiﬁcant epistemic category would mean
that an intuitionist moral epistemology would not have to claim both that
moral intuitions justify, and that certain substantive moral propositions
have the special epistemic status of being self-evident and so engage a
different sort of justiﬁer. All they need defend is the ﬁrst claim, and that
the justiﬁcation provided by some intuitions is sufﬁcient to ground know-
ledge. I maintain, therefore, that a clear understanding of what self-evident
propositions are should lead us to abandon this notion. The plausibility of
intuitionist epistemology will, then, stand or fall with a more general debate
about the role of intuitions in philosophy. All intuitionists need add to this
35 See Scanlon (1998: 95–100).
36 For a more detailed account, see Stratton-Lake (2006, 2013, and forthcoming).
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is that there is no good reason to suppose that moral intuitions should be
treated any differently from other a priori intuitions.
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